The Muslim Brotherhood

The Fractured Faces of the Muslim Brotherhood:

Double Identity, Single Vision

Robert Wilson

Eastern New Mexico University

May 1, 2015 

       With possible exception, no other group in the Middle East has garnered more attention in the last few years than the Ikhwan, or the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood has long been the focus of both Egyptian government crackdowns, planning multiple political assassinations, as well as having been empowered as an Egyptian political party. While the Brotherhood has gained immeasurable support from around the globe, they have also alienated just as many, if not more, through tactics and goals that at times are hard to nail down.
       Today the Muslim Brotherhood is seen by some to be a moderate secular organization, whose political ends, although heavily advocating Islamic “Sharia Law,” are also largely peaceful, while others view the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, whose ideology has made way for the creation of various hardline Islamic groups (i.e. Hamas, ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and Islamic Jihad.) How can one group convey both a moderate secular political motivation, while at the same time be seen as a group that in many ways is the father of modern terrorism? According to Mamoud Fandy, an Egyptian born American scholar and expert on the Muslim Brotherhood, “The Muslim Brotherhood had twin strategies, the first strategy is its public face, which is a political organization, with charitable organizations. But the core of the organization and the master plan of the organization is a sense of world domination. Their ambition is limitless.” 
       This paper will take an in-depth look at the history and ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and will attempt to answer many questions as to the many faces of the organization, as well as broaden the scope of just what the Muslim Brotherhood’s goals are, not only in Egypt, but across the Middle East, reaching as far as, but not limited to, urban areas of the United States.
This research paper will be divided up into four main parts. Parts one and two will take an in-depth look at a different Muslim Brotherhood leader(s), and will extrapolate their ideology based on both their writings and their actions while in leadership roles with the Brotherhood. The first section of this paper will look at Hassan al-Banna, the founder and first “guide” within the Brotherhood, his motivation in forming the group, as well as his goals for what he wanted to see in the future. From there, this paper will move to the (supposed) split that happened within the Brotherhood after al-Banna’s assassination in 1952. On the one side of the Brotherhood, under the guidance of Hasan al-Hudaybi, the group appeared to attempt to make inroads with the Egyptian government in the hopes of working with the secular Egyptian government. On the other side, the Brotherhood turned more violent and radical under the leadership of Sayyid Qutb, commonly known as the “father of modern Islamic fundamentalism.” The concluding segment of this paper will cover the Brotherhood in contemporary terms, and will attempt to make sense of the seemingly fractured image of the multi-faceted organization.

Section I: The Founding and Hassan al-Banna

       “You should yearn for an honourable death and you will gain perfect happiness. May Allah grant myself and yours the honour of martyrdom in His way!” -Imam Shaheed Hasan Al-Banna

       Founded in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan, hereafter referred to as the Muslim Brotherhood or the Brotherhood) was the idea and creation of an Egyptian schoolteacher named Hassan Al-Banna. At its founding the Muslim Brotherhood was likened to a youth club, a place where members would preach to any who would listen about the need to reform Muslim society away from the non-Muslim West and return to a more Islamic focused revivalism. Soon after its inception the Brotherhood expanded and Al-Banna shifted the organization’s focus onto the restoration of a Muslim Caliphate. Al-Banna created the credo for the Brotherhood, “God is our objective, the Koran is our Constitution, the Prophet is our leader, struggle [jihad] is our way, and death for the sake of God is the highest of our aspirations.”
       While Al-Banna, reportedly, gravitated towards a more extremist and xenophobic form of Islam from an early age, the Muslim Brotherhood did not move to a more violent front until the “Great Arab Revolt” in 1936-1939 (though there is evidence to suggest that Al-Banna “was directly involved in the organization of the 1929 riots which destroyed the 3,000-year-old Jewish community of Hebron.” ) During this time, a Muslim Brotherhood leader, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, incited his followers to a three year war against the Jews in Palestine (modern day Israel.)
       While the Brotherhood had approximately 800 members in 1936, its ranks swelled during the Revolt to an estimated 200,000 in 1938, with more than fifty branches in Egypt alone. Soon after the Brotherhood began developing a network of underground cells, acquired weapons (many stolen), trained fighters, created sleeper cells that infiltrated the ranks of the Egyptian government and military, and then waited. One notable characteristic about Al-Banna was his affinity and admiration for Adolf Hitler and the German Reich. These two organization shared quite a bit in common, including subordination to a central power, a focused aggression towards the Jewish people, and an anti-nationalistic belief. While both organizations were focused on global dominance and racial supremacy, the commonalities allowed the two parties to form at first practical interactions, and later on a full-fledged alliance. Al-Banna had written to Hitler on more than one occasion requesting assistance in fighting the British in Egypt and what he believed was a westernized regime in Egypt’s King Farouk.
       During this time the Brotherhood utilized its own internal intelligence agency in order to provide the Nazi’s with information on members of the regime in Cairo, as well as British troop movements. While Al-Banna believed in the supremacy of Islam and desired a global Caliphate, one could argue that he saw an alliance with the German Nazi party as a means to an end, one that would allow the destruction of a common enemy (the Jewish people) while at the same time push back on “Western” powers in the Middle East (and the British occupation of Egypt.) In 1948, when the United Nations took up the issue of Palestine and the formation of a Jewish State, both Al-Banna and Amin al-Husseini urged the unification of the Arab world against what they saw as “Jewish world conspiracy.” 
       One interesting and often confusing aspect to the Brotherhood was the British partnership and financing of the organization (which was heavily aligned with the Nazi party and Hitler) beginning in the early 1940’s. According to Mark Curtis, “The first known direct contact between British officials and the Brotherhood came in 1941, at a time when British intelligence regarded the organization’s mass following and sabotage plans against the British as ‘the most serious danger to public security’ in Egypt.”  Why then did the British meet with, negotiate with, and begin financing the Brotherhood starting in 1942? According to Curtis, the British government felt that the Brotherhood was dangerous but had weak leadership and tried to find ways to divide the group from the inside. 
“Thus, by the end of the Second World War, Britain already had considerable experience of colluding with Muslim forces to achieve certain objectives, while officials also realized that these same forces were generally opposed to British imperial policy and strategic objectives: they were temporary, ad hoc collaborators to achieve specific goals when Britain lacked other allies or sufficient power of its own to impose its priorities.” 
       While this strategy was employed by the British, it seems logical that al-Banna saw the usefulness in allowing the Brotherhood’s enemies (the British) to fund and support them while the Brotherhood progressed towards its own goals. This is where we potentially see the first double identity within the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood, aligned with Hitler and the Nazi’s, was funded by an Allied power, but could turn its own militarized wing on the British when convenient. In the last 1940’s al-Banna reportedly lost control of “al-Nizam al-Khass” (the Secret Apparatus), which was the militarized arm of the Brotherhood.  This came during an increasing anarchic political environment. While the Brotherhood had been passing information to the Egyptian government on the growing influence of communism (names, etc) in the area, it is doubtful that the dual identity the Brotherhood had between the rank and file members, and the British occupiers, had nothing to do with al-Banna’s power struggle with the secret apparatus.
       In 1948, Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmoud an-Nukrashi Pasha disbanded the Brotherhood at the national level, seizing the organization’s assets, while arresting and incarcerating many of its members. Pasha had been concerned that the Brotherhood (according to rumors) had been plotting to overthrow the Egyptian government, and worried by the Brotherhood’s rising influence and popularity. Less than three weeks later, Pasha had been assassinated by a member of the Brotherhood.  Interestingly, it was Pasha that acted as a liaison between the Muslim Brotherhood and the British government in 1942. Less than two months after the assassination of Pasha, Hasan al-Banna was shot and killed in a crowded Egyptian marketplace (speculation points to an Egyptian government agent.) Al-Banna died February 12, 1949.
Al-Banna’s ideology would continue (and evolve) through two others that would take his place at the head of the Brotherhood. In many ways, these two leaders encapsulate al-Banna’s double identity single vision focus.

Section II: Sayyid Qutb and Hassan al-Hudaybi

       The years following the assassination of al-Banna also ushered in a time of persecution for the Brotherhood under the new President of Egypt, Gamal Nasser, who had seized power from King Farouk in 1954. During this time, the Brotherhood elected a new general guide, Hassan al-Hudaybi. Hudaybi was not known as a violent proponent of terrorism. Hudaybi was a long-time friend of Hasan al-Banna, though much of his time as al-Banna’s personal advisor has been secretive. It is interesting to note that while Hudaybi was elected to lead the Muslim Brotherhood (as a general guide), he never truly gained control of the organization (this will become important as the apparent theological differences between Hudaybi and Qutb is explored.) Hudaybi believed that in order to achieve their goal of an Islamic state, it would be best to work with the Egyptian government instead of being at odds with it. Hudaybi (some would attest to inaction) created an ideological gap in the Brotherhood however.
       “Given the Brotherhood's desolate situation at the beginning of the mihna [test.persecution], it is not surprising that a stringent ideology was absent. Al-Hudaybi left hardly any guidelines that Brothers could hold onto in this situation. The few official addresses and rasd'il (statements) he issued between 1951 and 1954 made explicit references to political developments of years of relative collaboration with the regime. They did not provide any long-term strategies, policies, or spiritual advice”
       Hudaybi’s actions (or inactions) as a leader quickly gave rise for the Brotherhood to look elsewhere for a moral compass. The organization found this in Sayyid Qutb. Qutb was an Egyptian teacher who studied in the United States in-between 1948-1950. During his time in the U.S. he wrote about a growing disgust with what he perceived was American materialism. “How much do I need someone to talk to about topics other than money, movie stars and car models,”  he wrote to an Egyptian friend. He also said “Nobody goes to church as often as Americans do. . . . Yet no one is as distant as they are from the spiritual aspect of religion.”  In this, Qutb came to the conclusion that “I am afraid that there is no correlation between the greatness of the American material civilization and the men who created it. . . . In both feeling and conduct the American is primitive (bida’a).”
Upon his return to Egypt he quickly gained influence in the Brotherhood and would become the organization’s chief theological writer and was placed in charge of the Brotherhood’s propaganda section.  This gave Qutb a spring board from which he could easily disseminate his material and teachings. Some would argue that he was propelled into power within the Brotherhood because of the growing political and religious changes that the organization found themselves in while many of their leaders were incarcerated in Nasser’s prisons. According to Zollner, “one of the Brotherhood's most famous propagandists, 'Abd al-Qadir 'Awda, reemphasized that it is a religious duty to actively oppose state control if its leadership is not subscribing to sharia (Islamic law).”  For many in the Brotherhood this meant a direct conflict with Hudaybi’s notions of trying to affect change from within the secular system.
       While Qutb (and the Brotherhood) were in favor of Gamal Nasser’s coup against the Western aligned King Farouk, the relationship soured quickly as it became obvious that Nasser was implementing a secular nationalist government where Qutb wanted a strict Islamic Sharia based rule. Sources say that Qutb would host Nasser at his house, sometimes for 12 hours a day while they discussed what Egypt should look like in a post-monarchial age. What Qutb did not know however was that Nasser was using Qutb. While Nasser would meet with Qutb he also had his “Free Officers” work towards setting up an organization called “Tahreer” (Arabic for freedom.) When Qutb discovered this plot he distanced himself from Nasser and realized that Nasser was implementing a secular government. While Nasser attempted to bribe Qutb with any governmental position he wanted (excluding its kingship), Qutb rejected every offer. Soon after, Qutb and the Brotherhood began planning an assassination attempt on Nasser.
       Nasser quickly cracked down on the Brotherhood and jailed many of its members and some leaders, including Qutb. While Hudaybi served as the official guide for the Brotherhood (a position that members in the Brotherhood emphasis was never taken away), the organization asked Qutb to act as their spiritual guide.  Qutb used Organization 1965 (which was a core group of Brotherhood members who had either escaped prison under Nasser, or had been released from prison) in order to set up an educational agenda. With this in place, Qutb began disseminating his own writings to the Brotherhood. This is one place where the apparent separateness of Hudaybi and Qutb is interesting. Many sources assert that while Hudaybi never stepped down as general guide for the Brotherhood , he was in fact consulted about the direction that Qutb was taking the organization and the formation of Organization 1965. While some would argue that such a consultation does not necessarily mean approval, what is apparent was that Hudaybi chose to stay in the background during this time, and did not object to Abd al-Fattah as the group’s (Organization 1965) operational head. While some may assert that Hudaybi was not aware of such changes in the Brotherhood, Qutb’s ideological positions were no secret. It stands to reason that Hudaybi knew, and chose to abdicate the Brotherhood’s direction to Qutb. 
       Qutb was released from prison in 1964, but was rearrested eight months later on charges that he was plotting to overthrow the state. Given what some would consider to be a show trial, he was hung along with other leaders of the Brotherhood on August 29, 1966.
       Qutb’s theological stances and political positions were expressed in his writings, among which was his book “Milestones.” Qutb believed deeply that man should not be enslaved to another man, and he viewed government as a system by which men are subjugated to the will of others, which he considered to be “un-Islamic.”  Rather, Qutb expressed a political belief much in line with that of modern day anarchists. That instead of rule by a pious few (whether it be elected or a dictatorship,) men should rather voluntarily chose servitude to Allah. Such an enslavement was to put a man on the same level as god and thus was in violation of god’s sovereignty. In order to bring about this freedom from man to servitude to god, Qutb believed that in order to fight Jahiliyyah (ignorance of god’s sovereignty) a two-fold approach must be used. This included preaching in order to enlighten, and the abolishment of obstacles by “physical power and jihad.”  At his core Qutb believed that Islam and jihad were not meant to be defensive, but rather strictly offensive concepts.
       After Qutb’s death, there was once again an ideological vacuum within the Brotherhood. In seeking to capitalize on this vacuum, those close to Hudaybi began internal investigations into some Brothers who were a part of Qutb’s Organization 1965. The Brotherhood went through quite a bit of internal debate during this time as many of those jailed (old generation brother who ascribed more to Hudaybi, and Organization 1965 members who were very close to Qutb) under Nasser’s second wave of persecution were incarcerated in the same areas.
       A split became apparent between two opposing points of view. A radical faction, which was internally known as al-Qutbiyyun (the Qutbists), because they claimed to follow Sayyid Qutb's line of thought, stood in clear opposition to the old leadership guard, still with al-Hudaybi as the head. Proponents of this radical faction, among them Mustafa Shukri, effectively broke away from the Brotherhood and, from that point on, refused any association with their former Brothers. A significant number of Brothers appeared undecided. At stake in their decision was not only which account of second-wave persecution events they should trust, but also ultimately whether they should pledge allegiance to al-Hudaybi. A further issue was whether the future direction of the Brotherhood should rest on a radical activist ideology or on some form of conciliation with a regime that was essentially still seen as illegitimate.
       During this period, Hudaybi was also imprisoned under Nasser’s crackdown. While the debate separated the two factions, Hudaybi came out distancing himself from Qutbian’s Organization 1965.  While the Qutbians insisted that they were the true heirs of his (Qutb) legacy, they resisted Hudaybi’s call towards a conciliatory approach. Hudaybi targeted those brothers who were yet undecided between the two factions. While in prison Hudaybi finally finished Du'at la Qudat in February of 1969, which many deemed his answer and refutation towards Qutbian thought. Although not published until after his death in 1977, Du'at la Qudat emphasized preaching but not judging. Whereas Qutb believed that it was appropriate to implement takfir (the practice of declaring a Muslim a non-Muslim, effectively excommunicating them) Hudaybi resisted this push in his writings. Du'at la Qudat effectively criticized radical activism in three ways. These selected points are clear contradictions to three central concepts of radical interpretations (in Qutbianism), namely politicized takfir (charge of unbelief), the persistence of jahiliyyah into modern time, and hakimiyyat Allah (God's "absolute" sovereignty.)  What is interesting to note is that even though Hudaybi seems to contradict core principles of Qutbian doctrine, Du'at la Qudat does not actually mention Sayyid Qutb. Even more interesting are some of the questions raised by the work Du'at la Qudat. For instance, many scholars actually suspect that the book was not authored by Hudaybi at all. Regardless of its ultimate authorship Zollner concludes that
       “Evidently responding to the Qutbists, Du'at la Qudat is the product of an effort by the Brotherhood's leadership to regain control over the membership body. While the internal conflict reached its height, the 1967 war broke out. Brothers then faced the immediate question of whether to support the regime in the event of an external threat. Arguing that Nasser's regime was guilty of apostasy and was therefore the prime enemy, Qutbists took the position that the state system had to be opposed by any means. The war, and the devastating losses of the Egyptian army, brought to the fore the long overdue discussion on principles, objectives, and strategy. Ducat la Qudat was the long overdue directive on the guidance of the organization and suggested a conciliatory alternative to the vision of Qutbists. As its content and aim are not immediately directed against Qutb's work, no mention of him is necessary.


Section III: The Modern Day Brotherhood:

       Backtracking for a moment, one of the questions this paper has sought to elaborate on was the notion of a double identity but single vision for the Brotherhood. While many scholars seem to place the Brotherhoods retention of the Qubtists as an implication of the 1967 war, the pattern that is shown from al-Banna to present day Egypt has shown two faces that seem to be opposed (albeit in name only) to one another. What is not clear, and where many sources differ, is whether or not the split in the Brotherhood (which never actually “split”) was or was not by design. From its formation the Muslim Brotherhood has espoused peace and moderation, while taking part in political assassinations and advocating jihad in an offensive way. Hasan al-Banna allowed British funds and support to come into the Brotherhood coffers, yet sided with and aligned itself with Hitler and the Nazi party . The “Secret Apparatus” which largely operated as an autonomous entity, yet always at the ready for the mainstream Brotherhood. The Brotherhood, largely split by very different ideologies, yet one moderate leader abdicates his role and could be seen as merely a puppet-head. Even in present day terms, the Brotherhood has opened community hospitals all around Cairo and meets with American leaders at the White House , yet calls for more violence and more resistance amidst the Egyptian military trying to restore order to a politically unstable nation.  How can these two faces both be true? Are they two separate entities? Or have they continued something that Hasan al-Banna adopted with the British?
       What has the Muslim Brotherhood produced through this strategy? According to Ecaterina Matoi, Hamas (Harakat Al-Muquwama Al-Islamyya) (a terrorist organization as identified and designated by the United States Government) started as the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.  Osama bin-Laden was identified through Ayman Al-Zawahiri as a member of the Muslim Brotherhood.  In 2006 Rajab Hilal Hamida, a Muslim Brotherhood member serving in Egypt's parliament said, "From my point of view, bin Ladin, al-Zawahiri and [the late radical Islamist] al-Zarqawi are not terrorists in the sense accepted by some. I support all their activities, since they are a thorn in the side of the Americans and the Zionists."
       To know where the Brotherhood’s ideology is now, simply listen to what they have said. Today’s image for the Muslim Brotherhood is a hand where the fingers have been replaced by AK-47 rifles.
According to Dr. Tawfik Hamid one of the ideologies of the Muslim Brotherhood was to use a non-Islamic idea against non-Muslims. He explains that,
       “Somewhere in the “middle” was the Muslim Brotherhood. Their flag illustrates their philosophy. It depicts two swords and beneath them, the Arabic word Wa-Aiidu (“prepare”), based on the following verse:
       Prepare for them (the Infidels) whatever military power you have, so that you insert fear in the hearts of the enemies of Allah.   {Quran 8:60}
       They sought to infiltrate politics on the grassroots level and then use democracy to end democracy. 

       This statement holds the key to understanding the ideology and roadmap with which groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and many groups inspired or started by the Brotherhood will employ in order to see their vision fulfilled. Some have been duped into thinking that the Muslim Brotherhood is a secular moderate non-violent group whose aim is to bring stability, peace, and rights to its members. This has been brought about by the fact that many of the radical elements of “radical Islamic fundamentalism” have condemned the Brotherhood for its views on allowing its members to vote in state elections, and advocating working within the system to affect change. However, while contemporary reports are showing that radical elements and starting to fight each other (ISIS and the Taliban) it should be noted that these groups represent different factions of Islam. ISIS is a Sunni group, whereas the Taliban is a Shia group. No such declaration of hostility exists between the Muslim Brotherhood and the other radical Sunni elements (ISIS, Al-Qaeda, Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Al-Nusra Front, Boko Haram.)
       The author of this paper once held the thought that the Brotherhood was what their public face portrays. Truth be told, at the beginning of this research project it was the opinion of this author that the Brotherhood was caught in an internal struggle between a moderate majority, and a radical minority who wanted to distort the central theme of the Brotherhood. But once the research is looked through, and once the history of the organization comes out, its double natured but single destination focus cannot be overlooked. It is like a driveshaft that has two different sized gears attached to it. The driveshaft powers both gears, but the speed at which they move is different. In the same way, the Muslim Brotherhood has one destination (Islamic Sharia Law), using two speeds (moderation and radicalism,) and one engine (the Qur’an) to get there.


 
Bibliography
Curtis, Mark. Secret Affairs: Britain’s Collusion with Radical Islam. Serpent's Tail. 2010.
Fandy, Mamoud, interview by Investigative Project on Terrorism. A Brief History of the Muslim               Brotherhood 2012.
Isseroff, Ami. "Sayyid Qutb." Encyclopedia of the Middle East. 2008.
Matoi, Ecaterina. Academia.edu. May 23-25. 2013. Accessed May 1, 2015.
       http://www.academia.edu/3523995/_The_origins_of_Hamas_An_offshoot_of_Muslim_Brotherhood_or_a_result_of_the_PLO_s_moral_corruption_.
Meir-Levi, David. "“The Nazi Roots of Palestinian Nationalism and Islamic Jihad,”." Discover The        Networks. 2007. Accessed April 2015.
Qutb, Sayyid. Milestones. Maktabah Publishers. 2007.
Spencer, Robert. Front Page Mag. December 18. 2009. Accessed May 1, 2015.                                    http://www.frontpagemag.com/2009/robert-spencer/sayyid-qutb-and-the-virginia-five-by-robert-spencer/.
TV, Memri. Eman Nabih. September 27. 2012.
Zollner, Barbara. "Prison Talk; The Muslim Brotherhood's Internal Struggle during Gamal Abdel Nasser's Persecution. 1954-1971." International Journal of Middle East Studies 2007. 411-433.