Our current State of Law Enforcement

This may come as a shock to a lot of my fellow conservatives.... (and thats okay, I piss off people on the right (hopefully) as much as I piss off people on the left.) That being said:
I do not side (automatically) with law enforcement (just because they are law enforcement.)
 
Why you may ask?

For the same reason I don't automatically trust government. (the people that run government (and law enforcement) are corruptible people.... This is to say they CAN be corrupt. (Only Jesus was perfect.)

It is easy to demonize the police. It is equally easy to demonize the general public and label them (thugs, criminals, etc). We have in this country the presumption of innocence. Unfortunately, many people (and many cops) have forgotten this. This is not only important when it comes to those (thugs, criminals, etc).... it is the PRINCIPLE of the matter. It is important when dealing with thugs, criminals, etc BECAUSE it is important when it comes to the single mother who is assaulted in her own home, stripped naked and handcuffed in front of her own daughter.... yet NOT told why she was being arrested (when in fact the cops entered her house WITHOUT a warrant or probable cause (she had just gotten out of the shower.)

It is important that Freddie Grey retain the presumption of innocence, BECAUSE it is equally important for Cindy Hahn a mother who asked a cop a question, called to complain about the officer, the SAME officer minutes later pulled her over and harassed her, leading to her detainment.

We as a society must get back to principles. If it is wrong to do X when its one person... it should be wrong to do X when it's a different person.

Sadly, when it comes to issues like the Rule of Law, (most) cops are woefully ignorant of the law themselves. This has become apparent when the issue of recording/video taping police comes up.

Cops (like normal people) usually do not like being challenged on the issue of their supposed authority. But as pressing as this video shows the abuse of probable cause to be, take a look at how these cops (in Northern Florida) are dressed, and the vehicle they are patrolling the streets in.

 The truly sad part? We cannot even have the CONVERSATION about how some people should not be cops..... Check out this video, a man, in his own driveway, holding a camera, when a cop stops, and TERRORIZES this man for videotaping him. Ask yourself, should ANYONE step out of a vehicle and pull out their sidearm in this manner? What this cop did was an act of terrorism. (I do not throw that word out lightly.) Put yourself in this homeowners shoes....

What happens when you can be arrested for resisting arrest?
What happens when cops have no fear of openly killing a citizen?
How many cops does it take to shoot a man confined to a wheelchair who DIDN'T have a gun?
What recourse do you have, when cops can illegally search your property, without a warrant, and in doing so, shoot and kill, your family dog?

If we cannot be real, and identify that our CURRENT law enforcement is GROSSLY abusive of their authority, and ILL equipped and POORLY trained.... what hope do we have?

As Andrew Napolitano has been quoted, "It is dangerous to be right, when the government is wrong"...

Some of you might say, these are isolated incidents..... that I cherry pick the bad examples.
I do. I admit it. I cherry pick the bad examples JUST LIKE some will cherry pick examples of GOOD cops. Go take a look at other examples of bad cops.... and tell me if it as isolated as you claim... 

The Muslim Brotherhood

The Fractured Faces of the Muslim Brotherhood:

Double Identity, Single Vision

Robert Wilson

Eastern New Mexico University

May 1, 2015 

       With possible exception, no other group in the Middle East has garnered more attention in the last few years than the Ikhwan, or the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood has long been the focus of both Egyptian government crackdowns, planning multiple political assassinations, as well as having been empowered as an Egyptian political party. While the Brotherhood has gained immeasurable support from around the globe, they have also alienated just as many, if not more, through tactics and goals that at times are hard to nail down.
       Today the Muslim Brotherhood is seen by some to be a moderate secular organization, whose political ends, although heavily advocating Islamic “Sharia Law,” are also largely peaceful, while others view the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, whose ideology has made way for the creation of various hardline Islamic groups (i.e. Hamas, ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and Islamic Jihad.) How can one group convey both a moderate secular political motivation, while at the same time be seen as a group that in many ways is the father of modern terrorism? According to Mamoud Fandy, an Egyptian born American scholar and expert on the Muslim Brotherhood, “The Muslim Brotherhood had twin strategies, the first strategy is its public face, which is a political organization, with charitable organizations. But the core of the organization and the master plan of the organization is a sense of world domination. Their ambition is limitless.” 
       This paper will take an in-depth look at the history and ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and will attempt to answer many questions as to the many faces of the organization, as well as broaden the scope of just what the Muslim Brotherhood’s goals are, not only in Egypt, but across the Middle East, reaching as far as, but not limited to, urban areas of the United States.
This research paper will be divided up into four main parts. Parts one and two will take an in-depth look at a different Muslim Brotherhood leader(s), and will extrapolate their ideology based on both their writings and their actions while in leadership roles with the Brotherhood. The first section of this paper will look at Hassan al-Banna, the founder and first “guide” within the Brotherhood, his motivation in forming the group, as well as his goals for what he wanted to see in the future. From there, this paper will move to the (supposed) split that happened within the Brotherhood after al-Banna’s assassination in 1952. On the one side of the Brotherhood, under the guidance of Hasan al-Hudaybi, the group appeared to attempt to make inroads with the Egyptian government in the hopes of working with the secular Egyptian government. On the other side, the Brotherhood turned more violent and radical under the leadership of Sayyid Qutb, commonly known as the “father of modern Islamic fundamentalism.” The concluding segment of this paper will cover the Brotherhood in contemporary terms, and will attempt to make sense of the seemingly fractured image of the multi-faceted organization.

Section I: The Founding and Hassan al-Banna

       “You should yearn for an honourable death and you will gain perfect happiness. May Allah grant myself and yours the honour of martyrdom in His way!” -Imam Shaheed Hasan Al-Banna

       Founded in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan, hereafter referred to as the Muslim Brotherhood or the Brotherhood) was the idea and creation of an Egyptian schoolteacher named Hassan Al-Banna. At its founding the Muslim Brotherhood was likened to a youth club, a place where members would preach to any who would listen about the need to reform Muslim society away from the non-Muslim West and return to a more Islamic focused revivalism. Soon after its inception the Brotherhood expanded and Al-Banna shifted the organization’s focus onto the restoration of a Muslim Caliphate. Al-Banna created the credo for the Brotherhood, “God is our objective, the Koran is our Constitution, the Prophet is our leader, struggle [jihad] is our way, and death for the sake of God is the highest of our aspirations.”
       While Al-Banna, reportedly, gravitated towards a more extremist and xenophobic form of Islam from an early age, the Muslim Brotherhood did not move to a more violent front until the “Great Arab Revolt” in 1936-1939 (though there is evidence to suggest that Al-Banna “was directly involved in the organization of the 1929 riots which destroyed the 3,000-year-old Jewish community of Hebron.” ) During this time, a Muslim Brotherhood leader, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, incited his followers to a three year war against the Jews in Palestine (modern day Israel.)
       While the Brotherhood had approximately 800 members in 1936, its ranks swelled during the Revolt to an estimated 200,000 in 1938, with more than fifty branches in Egypt alone. Soon after the Brotherhood began developing a network of underground cells, acquired weapons (many stolen), trained fighters, created sleeper cells that infiltrated the ranks of the Egyptian government and military, and then waited. One notable characteristic about Al-Banna was his affinity and admiration for Adolf Hitler and the German Reich. These two organization shared quite a bit in common, including subordination to a central power, a focused aggression towards the Jewish people, and an anti-nationalistic belief. While both organizations were focused on global dominance and racial supremacy, the commonalities allowed the two parties to form at first practical interactions, and later on a full-fledged alliance. Al-Banna had written to Hitler on more than one occasion requesting assistance in fighting the British in Egypt and what he believed was a westernized regime in Egypt’s King Farouk.
       During this time the Brotherhood utilized its own internal intelligence agency in order to provide the Nazi’s with information on members of the regime in Cairo, as well as British troop movements. While Al-Banna believed in the supremacy of Islam and desired a global Caliphate, one could argue that he saw an alliance with the German Nazi party as a means to an end, one that would allow the destruction of a common enemy (the Jewish people) while at the same time push back on “Western” powers in the Middle East (and the British occupation of Egypt.) In 1948, when the United Nations took up the issue of Palestine and the formation of a Jewish State, both Al-Banna and Amin al-Husseini urged the unification of the Arab world against what they saw as “Jewish world conspiracy.” 
       One interesting and often confusing aspect to the Brotherhood was the British partnership and financing of the organization (which was heavily aligned with the Nazi party and Hitler) beginning in the early 1940’s. According to Mark Curtis, “The first known direct contact between British officials and the Brotherhood came in 1941, at a time when British intelligence regarded the organization’s mass following and sabotage plans against the British as ‘the most serious danger to public security’ in Egypt.”  Why then did the British meet with, negotiate with, and begin financing the Brotherhood starting in 1942? According to Curtis, the British government felt that the Brotherhood was dangerous but had weak leadership and tried to find ways to divide the group from the inside. 
“Thus, by the end of the Second World War, Britain already had considerable experience of colluding with Muslim forces to achieve certain objectives, while officials also realized that these same forces were generally opposed to British imperial policy and strategic objectives: they were temporary, ad hoc collaborators to achieve specific goals when Britain lacked other allies or sufficient power of its own to impose its priorities.” 
       While this strategy was employed by the British, it seems logical that al-Banna saw the usefulness in allowing the Brotherhood’s enemies (the British) to fund and support them while the Brotherhood progressed towards its own goals. This is where we potentially see the first double identity within the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood, aligned with Hitler and the Nazi’s, was funded by an Allied power, but could turn its own militarized wing on the British when convenient. In the last 1940’s al-Banna reportedly lost control of “al-Nizam al-Khass” (the Secret Apparatus), which was the militarized arm of the Brotherhood.  This came during an increasing anarchic political environment. While the Brotherhood had been passing information to the Egyptian government on the growing influence of communism (names, etc) in the area, it is doubtful that the dual identity the Brotherhood had between the rank and file members, and the British occupiers, had nothing to do with al-Banna’s power struggle with the secret apparatus.
       In 1948, Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmoud an-Nukrashi Pasha disbanded the Brotherhood at the national level, seizing the organization’s assets, while arresting and incarcerating many of its members. Pasha had been concerned that the Brotherhood (according to rumors) had been plotting to overthrow the Egyptian government, and worried by the Brotherhood’s rising influence and popularity. Less than three weeks later, Pasha had been assassinated by a member of the Brotherhood.  Interestingly, it was Pasha that acted as a liaison between the Muslim Brotherhood and the British government in 1942. Less than two months after the assassination of Pasha, Hasan al-Banna was shot and killed in a crowded Egyptian marketplace (speculation points to an Egyptian government agent.) Al-Banna died February 12, 1949.
Al-Banna’s ideology would continue (and evolve) through two others that would take his place at the head of the Brotherhood. In many ways, these two leaders encapsulate al-Banna’s double identity single vision focus.

Section II: Sayyid Qutb and Hassan al-Hudaybi

       The years following the assassination of al-Banna also ushered in a time of persecution for the Brotherhood under the new President of Egypt, Gamal Nasser, who had seized power from King Farouk in 1954. During this time, the Brotherhood elected a new general guide, Hassan al-Hudaybi. Hudaybi was not known as a violent proponent of terrorism. Hudaybi was a long-time friend of Hasan al-Banna, though much of his time as al-Banna’s personal advisor has been secretive. It is interesting to note that while Hudaybi was elected to lead the Muslim Brotherhood (as a general guide), he never truly gained control of the organization (this will become important as the apparent theological differences between Hudaybi and Qutb is explored.) Hudaybi believed that in order to achieve their goal of an Islamic state, it would be best to work with the Egyptian government instead of being at odds with it. Hudaybi (some would attest to inaction) created an ideological gap in the Brotherhood however.
       “Given the Brotherhood's desolate situation at the beginning of the mihna [test.persecution], it is not surprising that a stringent ideology was absent. Al-Hudaybi left hardly any guidelines that Brothers could hold onto in this situation. The few official addresses and rasd'il (statements) he issued between 1951 and 1954 made explicit references to political developments of years of relative collaboration with the regime. They did not provide any long-term strategies, policies, or spiritual advice”
       Hudaybi’s actions (or inactions) as a leader quickly gave rise for the Brotherhood to look elsewhere for a moral compass. The organization found this in Sayyid Qutb. Qutb was an Egyptian teacher who studied in the United States in-between 1948-1950. During his time in the U.S. he wrote about a growing disgust with what he perceived was American materialism. “How much do I need someone to talk to about topics other than money, movie stars and car models,”  he wrote to an Egyptian friend. He also said “Nobody goes to church as often as Americans do. . . . Yet no one is as distant as they are from the spiritual aspect of religion.”  In this, Qutb came to the conclusion that “I am afraid that there is no correlation between the greatness of the American material civilization and the men who created it. . . . In both feeling and conduct the American is primitive (bida’a).”
Upon his return to Egypt he quickly gained influence in the Brotherhood and would become the organization’s chief theological writer and was placed in charge of the Brotherhood’s propaganda section.  This gave Qutb a spring board from which he could easily disseminate his material and teachings. Some would argue that he was propelled into power within the Brotherhood because of the growing political and religious changes that the organization found themselves in while many of their leaders were incarcerated in Nasser’s prisons. According to Zollner, “one of the Brotherhood's most famous propagandists, 'Abd al-Qadir 'Awda, reemphasized that it is a religious duty to actively oppose state control if its leadership is not subscribing to sharia (Islamic law).”  For many in the Brotherhood this meant a direct conflict with Hudaybi’s notions of trying to affect change from within the secular system.
       While Qutb (and the Brotherhood) were in favor of Gamal Nasser’s coup against the Western aligned King Farouk, the relationship soured quickly as it became obvious that Nasser was implementing a secular nationalist government where Qutb wanted a strict Islamic Sharia based rule. Sources say that Qutb would host Nasser at his house, sometimes for 12 hours a day while they discussed what Egypt should look like in a post-monarchial age. What Qutb did not know however was that Nasser was using Qutb. While Nasser would meet with Qutb he also had his “Free Officers” work towards setting up an organization called “Tahreer” (Arabic for freedom.) When Qutb discovered this plot he distanced himself from Nasser and realized that Nasser was implementing a secular government. While Nasser attempted to bribe Qutb with any governmental position he wanted (excluding its kingship), Qutb rejected every offer. Soon after, Qutb and the Brotherhood began planning an assassination attempt on Nasser.
       Nasser quickly cracked down on the Brotherhood and jailed many of its members and some leaders, including Qutb. While Hudaybi served as the official guide for the Brotherhood (a position that members in the Brotherhood emphasis was never taken away), the organization asked Qutb to act as their spiritual guide.  Qutb used Organization 1965 (which was a core group of Brotherhood members who had either escaped prison under Nasser, or had been released from prison) in order to set up an educational agenda. With this in place, Qutb began disseminating his own writings to the Brotherhood. This is one place where the apparent separateness of Hudaybi and Qutb is interesting. Many sources assert that while Hudaybi never stepped down as general guide for the Brotherhood , he was in fact consulted about the direction that Qutb was taking the organization and the formation of Organization 1965. While some would argue that such a consultation does not necessarily mean approval, what is apparent was that Hudaybi chose to stay in the background during this time, and did not object to Abd al-Fattah as the group’s (Organization 1965) operational head. While some may assert that Hudaybi was not aware of such changes in the Brotherhood, Qutb’s ideological positions were no secret. It stands to reason that Hudaybi knew, and chose to abdicate the Brotherhood’s direction to Qutb. 
       Qutb was released from prison in 1964, but was rearrested eight months later on charges that he was plotting to overthrow the state. Given what some would consider to be a show trial, he was hung along with other leaders of the Brotherhood on August 29, 1966.
       Qutb’s theological stances and political positions were expressed in his writings, among which was his book “Milestones.” Qutb believed deeply that man should not be enslaved to another man, and he viewed government as a system by which men are subjugated to the will of others, which he considered to be “un-Islamic.”  Rather, Qutb expressed a political belief much in line with that of modern day anarchists. That instead of rule by a pious few (whether it be elected or a dictatorship,) men should rather voluntarily chose servitude to Allah. Such an enslavement was to put a man on the same level as god and thus was in violation of god’s sovereignty. In order to bring about this freedom from man to servitude to god, Qutb believed that in order to fight Jahiliyyah (ignorance of god’s sovereignty) a two-fold approach must be used. This included preaching in order to enlighten, and the abolishment of obstacles by “physical power and jihad.”  At his core Qutb believed that Islam and jihad were not meant to be defensive, but rather strictly offensive concepts.
       After Qutb’s death, there was once again an ideological vacuum within the Brotherhood. In seeking to capitalize on this vacuum, those close to Hudaybi began internal investigations into some Brothers who were a part of Qutb’s Organization 1965. The Brotherhood went through quite a bit of internal debate during this time as many of those jailed (old generation brother who ascribed more to Hudaybi, and Organization 1965 members who were very close to Qutb) under Nasser’s second wave of persecution were incarcerated in the same areas.
       A split became apparent between two opposing points of view. A radical faction, which was internally known as al-Qutbiyyun (the Qutbists), because they claimed to follow Sayyid Qutb's line of thought, stood in clear opposition to the old leadership guard, still with al-Hudaybi as the head. Proponents of this radical faction, among them Mustafa Shukri, effectively broke away from the Brotherhood and, from that point on, refused any association with their former Brothers. A significant number of Brothers appeared undecided. At stake in their decision was not only which account of second-wave persecution events they should trust, but also ultimately whether they should pledge allegiance to al-Hudaybi. A further issue was whether the future direction of the Brotherhood should rest on a radical activist ideology or on some form of conciliation with a regime that was essentially still seen as illegitimate.
       During this period, Hudaybi was also imprisoned under Nasser’s crackdown. While the debate separated the two factions, Hudaybi came out distancing himself from Qutbian’s Organization 1965.  While the Qutbians insisted that they were the true heirs of his (Qutb) legacy, they resisted Hudaybi’s call towards a conciliatory approach. Hudaybi targeted those brothers who were yet undecided between the two factions. While in prison Hudaybi finally finished Du'at la Qudat in February of 1969, which many deemed his answer and refutation towards Qutbian thought. Although not published until after his death in 1977, Du'at la Qudat emphasized preaching but not judging. Whereas Qutb believed that it was appropriate to implement takfir (the practice of declaring a Muslim a non-Muslim, effectively excommunicating them) Hudaybi resisted this push in his writings. Du'at la Qudat effectively criticized radical activism in three ways. These selected points are clear contradictions to three central concepts of radical interpretations (in Qutbianism), namely politicized takfir (charge of unbelief), the persistence of jahiliyyah into modern time, and hakimiyyat Allah (God's "absolute" sovereignty.)  What is interesting to note is that even though Hudaybi seems to contradict core principles of Qutbian doctrine, Du'at la Qudat does not actually mention Sayyid Qutb. Even more interesting are some of the questions raised by the work Du'at la Qudat. For instance, many scholars actually suspect that the book was not authored by Hudaybi at all. Regardless of its ultimate authorship Zollner concludes that
       “Evidently responding to the Qutbists, Du'at la Qudat is the product of an effort by the Brotherhood's leadership to regain control over the membership body. While the internal conflict reached its height, the 1967 war broke out. Brothers then faced the immediate question of whether to support the regime in the event of an external threat. Arguing that Nasser's regime was guilty of apostasy and was therefore the prime enemy, Qutbists took the position that the state system had to be opposed by any means. The war, and the devastating losses of the Egyptian army, brought to the fore the long overdue discussion on principles, objectives, and strategy. Ducat la Qudat was the long overdue directive on the guidance of the organization and suggested a conciliatory alternative to the vision of Qutbists. As its content and aim are not immediately directed against Qutb's work, no mention of him is necessary.


Section III: The Modern Day Brotherhood:

       Backtracking for a moment, one of the questions this paper has sought to elaborate on was the notion of a double identity but single vision for the Brotherhood. While many scholars seem to place the Brotherhoods retention of the Qubtists as an implication of the 1967 war, the pattern that is shown from al-Banna to present day Egypt has shown two faces that seem to be opposed (albeit in name only) to one another. What is not clear, and where many sources differ, is whether or not the split in the Brotherhood (which never actually “split”) was or was not by design. From its formation the Muslim Brotherhood has espoused peace and moderation, while taking part in political assassinations and advocating jihad in an offensive way. Hasan al-Banna allowed British funds and support to come into the Brotherhood coffers, yet sided with and aligned itself with Hitler and the Nazi party . The “Secret Apparatus” which largely operated as an autonomous entity, yet always at the ready for the mainstream Brotherhood. The Brotherhood, largely split by very different ideologies, yet one moderate leader abdicates his role and could be seen as merely a puppet-head. Even in present day terms, the Brotherhood has opened community hospitals all around Cairo and meets with American leaders at the White House , yet calls for more violence and more resistance amidst the Egyptian military trying to restore order to a politically unstable nation.  How can these two faces both be true? Are they two separate entities? Or have they continued something that Hasan al-Banna adopted with the British?
       What has the Muslim Brotherhood produced through this strategy? According to Ecaterina Matoi, Hamas (Harakat Al-Muquwama Al-Islamyya) (a terrorist organization as identified and designated by the United States Government) started as the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.  Osama bin-Laden was identified through Ayman Al-Zawahiri as a member of the Muslim Brotherhood.  In 2006 Rajab Hilal Hamida, a Muslim Brotherhood member serving in Egypt's parliament said, "From my point of view, bin Ladin, al-Zawahiri and [the late radical Islamist] al-Zarqawi are not terrorists in the sense accepted by some. I support all their activities, since they are a thorn in the side of the Americans and the Zionists."
       To know where the Brotherhood’s ideology is now, simply listen to what they have said. Today’s image for the Muslim Brotherhood is a hand where the fingers have been replaced by AK-47 rifles.
According to Dr. Tawfik Hamid one of the ideologies of the Muslim Brotherhood was to use a non-Islamic idea against non-Muslims. He explains that,
       “Somewhere in the “middle” was the Muslim Brotherhood. Their flag illustrates their philosophy. It depicts two swords and beneath them, the Arabic word Wa-Aiidu (“prepare”), based on the following verse:
       Prepare for them (the Infidels) whatever military power you have, so that you insert fear in the hearts of the enemies of Allah.   {Quran 8:60}
       They sought to infiltrate politics on the grassroots level and then use democracy to end democracy. 

       This statement holds the key to understanding the ideology and roadmap with which groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and many groups inspired or started by the Brotherhood will employ in order to see their vision fulfilled. Some have been duped into thinking that the Muslim Brotherhood is a secular moderate non-violent group whose aim is to bring stability, peace, and rights to its members. This has been brought about by the fact that many of the radical elements of “radical Islamic fundamentalism” have condemned the Brotherhood for its views on allowing its members to vote in state elections, and advocating working within the system to affect change. However, while contemporary reports are showing that radical elements and starting to fight each other (ISIS and the Taliban) it should be noted that these groups represent different factions of Islam. ISIS is a Sunni group, whereas the Taliban is a Shia group. No such declaration of hostility exists between the Muslim Brotherhood and the other radical Sunni elements (ISIS, Al-Qaeda, Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Al-Nusra Front, Boko Haram.)
       The author of this paper once held the thought that the Brotherhood was what their public face portrays. Truth be told, at the beginning of this research project it was the opinion of this author that the Brotherhood was caught in an internal struggle between a moderate majority, and a radical minority who wanted to distort the central theme of the Brotherhood. But once the research is looked through, and once the history of the organization comes out, its double natured but single destination focus cannot be overlooked. It is like a driveshaft that has two different sized gears attached to it. The driveshaft powers both gears, but the speed at which they move is different. In the same way, the Muslim Brotherhood has one destination (Islamic Sharia Law), using two speeds (moderation and radicalism,) and one engine (the Qur’an) to get there.


 
Bibliography
Curtis, Mark. Secret Affairs: Britain’s Collusion with Radical Islam. Serpent's Tail. 2010.
Fandy, Mamoud, interview by Investigative Project on Terrorism. A Brief History of the Muslim               Brotherhood 2012.
Isseroff, Ami. "Sayyid Qutb." Encyclopedia of the Middle East. 2008.
Matoi, Ecaterina. Academia.edu. May 23-25. 2013. Accessed May 1, 2015.
       http://www.academia.edu/3523995/_The_origins_of_Hamas_An_offshoot_of_Muslim_Brotherhood_or_a_result_of_the_PLO_s_moral_corruption_.
Meir-Levi, David. "“The Nazi Roots of Palestinian Nationalism and Islamic Jihad,”." Discover The        Networks. 2007. Accessed April 2015.
Qutb, Sayyid. Milestones. Maktabah Publishers. 2007.
Spencer, Robert. Front Page Mag. December 18. 2009. Accessed May 1, 2015.                                    http://www.frontpagemag.com/2009/robert-spencer/sayyid-qutb-and-the-virginia-five-by-robert-spencer/.
TV, Memri. Eman Nabih. September 27. 2012.
Zollner, Barbara. "Prison Talk; The Muslim Brotherhood's Internal Struggle during Gamal Abdel Nasser's Persecution. 1954-1971." International Journal of Middle East Studies 2007. 411-433.

Annotated Bibliography for Critical Analysis of Research.

The following is my rough draft for my Critical Analysis of Research Class. It is not the whole paper, just the Annotated Bibliography

Research Question: What is the Relationship Between Ease of Voter Registration and Election Day Turnout, and what Factors Contribute to Turnout?

School One: Voter Identification Laws, much like Poll Taxes, Suppress Poor and Minority Voting

Brendan Friedman. "The Forgotten Amendment and Voter Identification: How the New Wave of             Voter Identification Laws Violate the Twenty-Fourth Amendment." Hostra Law Review          vol 42, Issue 1, 2013, p343-382. Accessed February 17, 2015

“While there is no consensus within the social science community, studies have shown that voter identification laws do impact turnout” (Friedman). This article written by Brendan Friedman asserts that voter identification laws, operating in the same way as poll taxes (which have been found to be a violation of the twenty-fourth amendment, and thus), suppress voter turnout. In Friedman’s article he admits that historically, “Most challenges to voter identification requirements have been unsuccessful. (Friedman)” Yet Friedman asserts that, “Nevertheless, various prior decisions of the Supreme Court and lower courts support the notion that the new wave of voter identification laws may violate the Twenty-Fourth Amendment.” Friedman continues, “Courts might be willing to consider the poll tax argument more seriously if these studies can demonstrate real burdens. (Friedman)”

Friedman’s article, while arguing that voter identification laws currently violate the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, goes into sufficient detail in laying out the history of case law and Supreme Court decisions (Harman v. Forsseniusm; Breedlove v. Suttles; Butler v. Thompson) that have affected the history and implementation of America’s elections and the interpretation of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Friedman goes on to elaborate how the courts have stated that there be a distinction between a poll tax and how “the imposition of tangential burdens does not transform a regulation into a poll tax. (Friedman)” While Friedman argues that contemporary voter identifications laws are a violation of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, based on the poll tax argument, understanding the rationale of his points is important to understanding the flaws in his argument.

             “Courts have generally not been persuaded by arguments that incidental costs associated with obtaining sufficient identification to participate in an election constitute a poll tax. (Friedman)” In this Friedman goes on to assert that, “It is worth revisiting the distinction between the incidental costs of voting and burdens reaching the level of a poll tax. (Friedman)” The relationship between ease of registration and voter turnout cannot be seen without also looking at what many deem “incidental costs.” While Friedman asserts that the costs of getting identification should be included in the totality of the “cost to vote,” many of the required articles to obtain such registration were not intended to be a supposed “voter identification article.” Such things being a Social Security card, Birth Certificate, Driver’s License, etc. These documents all have other primary functions outside the realm of elections and voter registration, thus the costs included in Friedman’s assertion are secondary and thus not in the realm of a poll tax.

Robert Ellis Smith, and Richard Sobel. "Demands for Voter Identification Require a Constitutional Standard of Reasonable Suspicion of Illegal Activity." American Political Science Association, vol 42, No 1, 2009, 103-105.

“Because voting is so fundamental and empowering a right, the Supreme Court must ensure that a predictable, proportional, constitutionally sound standard regulates when, and to what degree, the government may require that a citizen self-identify as a pre-requisite to exercising the fundamental right to vote. The Court must also indicate when that standard is triggered by suspicious evidence before depriving a person of the opportunity to vote. (Smith and Sobel)” 

Whereas Friedman went into detail concerning the use and structure of Poll Taxes, Sobel and Smith lay out the case for a “Constitutional Standard” to be adopted in regards to voter identification laws and their implementation. According to their study, the use of having to identify oneself (with requisite photo identification) for the purpose of voting is liken to having to provide law enforcement with identification and thus includes the subsequent protection of the fourth amendment in such cases. They assert that, “The requirement that in-person voters present photo identification in order to vote infringes upon the fundamental electoral right by failing to comply with any proportional, constitutionally justifiable standard. (Smith and Sobel)” Their reasoning is that by placing such a substantial burden upon the voter so as to likely suppress the probability of the individual going to place their vote is something from which there must be a constitutionally equal standard that governs when government can ask for a photo identification.

They state, “Absent probable cause, the government cannot infringe upon the fourth amendment by requiring citizens to identify themselves to any degree more intrusive than stating their names. (Smith and Sobel)”

Such a view is important to consider when looking at voting in the United States. While this research project is more focused on the relationship between ease of voting and its effects on voter turnout, it cannot be understated that many of the positions taken by those who both advocate photo identification, and those that oppose photo identification, will have an effect on the notion of the individual vote “counting.” Such notions will likely either provoke or dismiss a would-be voter from turning out to vote if they believe that their vote is not important or will not be counted. Most troubling however, is that Smith and Sobel seem to advocate for the Supreme Court to adopt such a standard by stating, “In sum, the U.S. Supreme Court should adopt a predictable, constitutionally sound standard to regulate when, and to what degree, the government can require a citizen to identify themselves to exercise the right to vote. (Smith and Sobel)” Never mind the fact that such a ‘law’ would have to at least originate in the United States Congress, the main fallacy which Smith and Sobel seem to fall prey to, is that as an American, a citizen has the “right” to vote. This in and by itself is critical to understand when the subject of voting in America comes up. This will likely be the next evolution of the “voter identification laws” battleground and will be no less important.

School Two: Voter Identification Laws are Common in International Elections and Thus Do Not Suppress Voter Turnout by Minorities and the Poor

Tova Wang. Voter Identification Requirements and Public International Law: An Examination    of Africa and Latin America . Policy Research Center, Atlanta: The Carter Center. 2010

The Carter Center published this report that goes into great detail with regards to how voter identification laws are handled on the international stage. The report focuses on both African and Central American nations and probe multiple issues, and states that, “Requirements for proving identity to register to vote and to vote at the polls vary a great deal depending on numerous factors, including the political situation, capacity of the government, environment, culture, history of conflict, and poverty levels. (Wang)” While in America voter identification laws are met with stringent opposition with claims of being racially suppressive, it is interesting to note that in many developing nations the requirement to prove one’s identity both to register to vote, and to cast a vote at the ballot box are often times much more significant. Take for instance Nigeria, where the report details, “In law, potential registrants must prove their identity using a birth or baptismal certificate, national passport, identity card, driver’s license, or any other document that will prove the identity, age, and nationality of the applicant. (Wang)” And then must use the issued voter card given at registration in order to cast a vote at the ballot box. Such stringent practices should be viewed in a comparative study of American elections, especially when one side of the political spectrum seeks to label voter identification laws as racially suppressive. Once the stigma that often is associated with voter identification laws is stripped away, a clearer understanding might take place when looking at why American election cycles has been in a consistent decline.

School Three: Removing Even The Most Minor Of Obstacles In Voter Registration Can Cause Election Day Turnout To Decrease.

Raymond Wolfinger, and Jonathan Hoffman. "Registering and Voting with Motor Voter." Political Science and Politics vol 34, No 1, 2001, 85-92.

Wolfinger and Hoffman published a study that examines the effects that registering eligible voters with the motor vehicle agencies (known as the National Voter Registration Act (1993), hereafter known as “Motor Voter”) around the country have had on voter turnout when compared to the desire to make such registrations more accessible with fewer potential obstacles. As the study indicated, “The National Voter Registration Act was premised on a belief that easier registration would lead to higher turnout. (Wolfinger and Hoffman)” The study went on to conclude that, “Although we cannot exclude the possibility that motor voter affected turnout in 1996, our findings are consistent with the proposition that costless registration is associated with an increase in nonvoting registrants. (Wolfinger and Hoffman)”

This premise cannot be excluded in current studies that seek to explain how voter identification laws suppress voter turnout. While other sources (Indiana Secretary of State, Texas Secretary of State) show a consistent decline in voter turnout over the last seventy years, the above referenced findings of Wolfinger and Hoffman shed light on at least one possible indicator for the falling voter turnout figures. This study is critical in laying the ground work for the premise that 1) Voter Turnout has been decreasing well before the controversy of identification laws, and 2) the possible correlation between the ease with which voting takes place and the premise that voting (in such a user friendly environment) is treated as a mundane thing and thus not an important civic duty.

Mary Fitzgerald. "Greater Convenience But Not Greater Turnout." American Politics Research vol 33, No 6, 2005, 842-867.

            “The idea that easier voting methods stimulate higher turnout in elections makes sense in theory; however, the question is whether these reforms increase turnout in reality (Fitzgerald)”

In this study, Mrs. Fitzgerald researches the notion that in light of declining voter turnout in contemporary American culture, most law makers tend to first look at registration rates as the answer to increasing future turnout. The argument here, is that by increasing registration numbers you will increase election-day numbers. This study examines not just the relationship between turnout and registration numbers, but also the effect that socio-economic classes have on voter turnout. “Significantly, the findings show that most voting reforms do not stimulate turnout, thereby revealing the relative weakness of the structural-legal theory with regard to explaining participation in U.S. elections. (Fitzgerald)” The study goes on to suggest that “Participation in recent U.S. elections has revealed a politically engaged class that is not only growing smaller but also less representative of the American polity. Specifically, participation in elections is most concentrated among individuals with a high socioeconomic status, who are most likely to be interested in and have the resources important for political participation. (Fitzgerald)” This is an important distinction as it shifts the cost burden of voter turnout (structural-legal theory) and places more emphasis on the socio-economic levels of interest in the individual person. The study concludes with the statement that, “Based on the evidence, compared to the costs of registration and getting to the ballot box, the more significant costs surrounding electoral participation are those related to political knowledge, interest, and engagement. (Fitzgerald)” This statement is crucial to this research project as it places more emphasis on a person’s interest level in the political spectrum rather than on the cost-burden of the voting process itself. This notion, compiled with other sources (Wolfinger, Texas secretary of State) that show that ease of registration and ease at the ballot box do not increase voter turnout show a substantive relationship between “costless voting.” While the above studies show that attempts at making voting as costless as possible are actually decreasing election-day turnout, no studies have been done that seek to show that making voting more difficult would conversely increase election-day turnout. It suggests that there is an optimal level whereby turnout is increased, though not when “excessive” burdens are placed on the individual voter.

School Four: Election Day Turnout is/was decreasing well before the implementation of Voter Identification Laws.

"Voter Registration and Turnout Statistics." Indiana Secretary of State. Accessed Feb 28, 2015 http://www.in.gov/sos/elections/2983.htm

Indiana’s voter identification laws have been on the books since 2005. This allows for five election cycles (ten years of data on voter turnout and statistics.) What is most interesting about Indiana’s statistics is the slight increase in voter turnout from 2004 into the 2006-08 election seasons. While data has been gathered from both general and primary election cycles, we can see a substantial increase in voter turnout in the 2008 cycle, and while there does seem to be a very recent decrease in voter turnout from 2012 to 2014 not enough data has been gathered to signify that this is due to the voter identification laws and not a pattern of decreasing election turnouts in the United States as a whole over the last one hundred and seventy years. Since Indiana stands as both a viable option (concerning those that advocate voter identification laws) for other states to emulate, and as a target which those that oppose voter identification laws focus their opposition, it stands to reason that Indiana’s “Voter ID” laws should be a focal point of any research into the affects that voter identification laws have on turnout/suppression. While this research paper is looking at the broader relationship in the overall decrease in voter turnout over the last seventy years, the inclusion of apparent increases in voter turnout due to the recent identification law changes is noteworthy and important when looking at a consistent downward trend in voter turnout history.

"Turnout and Voter Registration Figures (1970-current)." Texas Secretary of State. Accessed Feb 28, 2015. http://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/historical/70-92.shtml

When talking about voter identification laws in contemporary political United States culture, two states will undoubtedly come to the forefront of the discussion. Indiana (whose identification laws have been on the books since 2005,) and Texas. While the photo identification laws have not been in place (in Texas) long enough to warrant empirical data extraction, the state (and its historical voter turnout) are a vital piece of information when looking at the relationship between ease of registration and voter turnout on election day. The following chart is data collected from forty-four years of elections in the State of Texas. For the purposes of simplicity information listed is only from general elections held in Texas every two years (both Gubernatorial and Presidential.) One very important event that corresponds to the chart is the “National Voter Registration Act of 1993” which took effect in 1996 (and thus shows up in following election cycles). Interestingly while voter registration rose to their highest points following the NVRA (up more than 20 percentage points) voter turnout did not increase. This fact is crucial in seeking to first identify that higher registration does not necessarily lead to higher turnout, rather the opposite seems to be true. Voter turnout (though on a consistent decline since the 1970’s fell disproportionately following the implementation of NVRA.

School Five: Factors Other Than Voter Identification Laws Affect Election Day Turnout.

Benjamin Highton. "Voter Registration and Turnout in the United States." Perspectives on Politics Vol 2, No 3, 2004, 507-515

One issue that cannot be overlooked when it comes to voter turnout trends amid laws that deal with ease of registration is the issue of voter cost vs benefit, specifically cost vs benefit for the individual voter. The study explains (of the issue of cost), “The individual costs of registration are now lower than they have been at any time since the widespread adoption of state registration requirements. And, given that all states are now required to have motor voter programs or election-day registration, registration costs cannot go much lower. (Highton)” If we take the study as an accurate representation of the costs associated with registering to vote, then it stands to reason that a major variable that affects voter turnout rates is the benefit that the individual perceives they gain from the process of voting at the ballot box. While the study does not explore the indeterminate ways upon which an individual might find a benefit to voting, it does conclude that, “continued nonvoting by substantial numbers of citizens suggests that for many people, voting remains an activity from which there is virtually no gratification; instrumental, expressive, or otherwise. Consequently, for those whose goal is a democracy where most people engage in the fundamental act of political participation, a pessimistic conclusion cannot be avoided. (Highton)” What is important to note from this study, and what this research project wishes to draw from, is that while there is a disproportionate number of claims that suggest that voter identification laws somehow suppress voting from minorities, an often ignored fact is the role of the perception of benefit that the individual voter brings with them. While other sources focus on declining turnout trends over the last numerous decades, very few have studied the reasons why people decide not to vote, away from the illusionary controversy of costs, poll taxes, and voter suppression. It stands to reason that if registration and voting costs cannot go much lower, and turnout rates have been in decline well before the controversy surrounding voter identification requirements were passed, then a major focal point should be the apparent absence of a sense of benefit from which the individual voter decides whether or not to vote.

Jamelle Bouie. "Making Voting Constitutional." American Prospect. 30 2013. Accessed February 23, 2015. http://prospect.org/article/making-voting-constitutional.

In regards to the research subject that this paper is looking at, it would be negligent not to include an often overlooked and little known caveat that is gaining momentum within sections of United States society. Within any discussion concerning voting turnout or voter suppression the United States Constitution is often cited when bringing giving minorities the right to vote, women the right to vote, and eighteen year olds the right to vote. Jamelle Bouie in an article for American Prospect “Making Voting Constitutional” states that, “These amendments were passed in different circumstances, but they share one thing in common… they’re statements of negative liberty, establishing whom the government can’t restrict when it comes to voting. Beyond these guidelines, states have wide leeway in how they construct voting systems. (Bouie)” The article was in response to former Attorney General Eric Holder’s speech where he stated of voting, “This is not a privilege. The right to vote is something that is fundamental to who we are as Americans. (Bouie)” Bouie continues the article calling for a Constitutional Amendment that gives not just the “negative liberty” protections of not being denied the ability to vote, but also an affirmative “right-to-vote” where “Proponents say that an affirmative constitutional right would, at the very least, force state lawmakers and election administrators to think twice about measures and election procedures that harm voters. (Bouie)” This article, though not truly a ‘primary source’ document serves to provide a cultural backdrop which will be used to later navigate what a Constitutional Right to Vote might look like, identify what purpose it would serve, and in which the language would be crucial in dealing with partisanship on both sides of the political spectrum. This source will be used in conjunction with another that goes into a Constitutional Amendment of the Right to Vote in much more detail.

Keith Jakee and Guang-Zhen Sun. "Is Compulsory Voting More Democratic." Public Choice, Vol 129, No 1/2, 2006 61-75.

Of the many subjects that have been brought up when the typical discussion of elections and voter turnout arises, one that is gaining more traction (though it was an idea put forth over a hundred years ago in the United States) is that of making voting in elections mandatory. The term used is “compulsory voting.” One such journal study that takes a look at the issues surrounding compulsory voting is the article “Is Compulsory Voting more Democratic.” The paper takes a look at the divide between voting as a ‘civic duty’ to that of voting as a ‘right,’ and states that “the normative debate over compulsory voting typically asks whether voting should be viewed as a civic duty, like paying taxes and following traffic laws, or as a right that can be disposed of in a manner decided upon by the individual citizen. Those who view it as a duty, judge the uniformity in turnout and the ability to overcome the under representation of lower socio-economic groups at the polls to be worth the restrictions on freedoms.” While other studies/sources (within this research project) have found that there is a greater number of non-voters that would tend to lean more democratic in their views than lean conservative, the above article takes a closer look at the issues and possible consequences of making the goal 100% voter turnout based on compulsory laws. “Advocating the maximization of voter turnout - by any means, including coercion - is fraught with more complications than the commonly accepted one of infringing upon the citizen's right to choose not to participate in the electoral process: we showed that as more random voters are forced to cast ballots, the more likely the electoral outcome will approximate a coin toss,” the study concludes. What this means is that if the desire is for full voter turnout based on compulsory laws, then the result will likely be the diminishing ability for the integrity of the voting system as a whole to be held with any sense of national pride or authority.

While this paper’s focus is on the relationship between ease of registration and decreasing voter turnout, it is noteworthy to take a serious look at possible solutions to diminishing numbers of voters who actually cast a ballot at election time. While compulsory voting is not a new idea, it is one that has been gaining momentum recently in the United States, and it should be looked at to see what it offers, both positively and negatively.

Notes

1)      Benjamin Highton. "Voter Registration and Turnout in the United States." Perspectives on Politics Vol 2 No 3 2004 507-515.

2)      Brendan Friedman. "The Forgotten Amendment and Voter Identification." Hostra Law Review. vol 42. Issue 1(2013) p 343-382. Accessed February 17, 2015.

3)      Jamelle Bouie. "Making Voting Constitutional." American Prospect. 30 2013. Accessed February 23, 2015. http://prospect.org/article/making-voting-constitutional.

4)  Keith Jakee, and Guang-Zhen Sun. "Is Compulsory Voting More Democratic." Public Choice, Vol 129, No 1/2 2006 61-75.

5)   Mary Fitzgerald. "Greater Convenience But Not Greater Turnout." American Politics Research vol 33 No 6 2005. 842-867.

6)   Raymond E Wolfinger, and Jonathan Hoffman. "Registering and Voting with Motor Voter." Political Science and Politics 2001 85-92.

7)   Robert Ellis Smith, and Richard Sobel. "Demands for Voter Identification Require a Constitutional Standard of Reasonable Suspicion of Illegal Activity." American Political Science Association vol 42 No 1 2009 103-105.

8)   "Turnout and Voter Registration Figures (1970-current)." Texas Secretary of State. Accessed Feb 28, 2015. http://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/historical/70-92.shtml.

9)   Tova Wang. Voter Identification Requirements and Public International Law: An Examination of Africa and Latin America . Policy Research Center, Atlanta: The Carter Center. 2010

10) "Voter Registration and Turnout Statistics." Indiana Secretary of State. Accessed Feb 28, 2015.